voxel-it
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses session transcript files located in
~/.claude/projects/<project-slug>/*.jsonl. These logs contain the full history of user messages and agent responses, presenting a significant data exposure risk.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands, includingsipsfor image rotation and a Python script for parsing session transcripts. This script is generated and executed dynamically based on instructions in the markdown.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill usescurlto upload local image assets to remote URLs. While intended for processing, this establishes a network path for data leaving the local environment.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface when processing user photos.\n - Ingestion points: User-provided images (URL or local path).\n
- Boundary markers: The prompt templates use thematic sections but lack explicit instructions for the model to ignore potential instructions embedded within the image content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
generate_image_edit,upload_asset, andremove_backgroundtools, alongside shell execution capabilities (sips,curl,python3).\n - Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization of image content or metadata is performed before the generation process.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata