pytidb
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Several templates in the skill process untrusted data which is subsequently included in prompts sent to Large Language Models (LLMs). Specifically,
templates/text2sql.pyuses user questions to generate SQL, whiletemplates/rag.pyandtemplates/memory_lib.pyinterpolate database retrieval results into generation prompts. - Ingestion points: User input is captured via
input()in interactive templates, and external data enters the context through database search results (table.search()). - Boundary markers: The prompts use basic text delimiters (e.g., "---------------------" in the RAG template) but lack robust instruction-isolation mechanisms.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute SQL queries (
db.query) and write to the database (table.insert,table.bulk_insert). - Sanitization: The Text2SQL template implements a
is_readonly_sqlcheck to block non-SELECT statements and requires explicit user confirmation (confirm = input(...)) before executing generated queries. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
templates/text2sql.pytemplate is designed to execute SQL commands dynamically generated by an LLM. Although the template includes a read-only keyword filter and a human-in-the-loop confirmation step, the execution of model-generated code constitutes a known security risk if the filtering logic is bypassed or if users are tricked into approving malicious queries.
Audit Metadata