provider-research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon data from external, untrusted sources which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The researcher agent reads comments from GitHub issues using the
ghCLI, parses provider changelogs and documentation via web searches, and references external benchmarks from theaiewf-evalrepository. - Boundary markers: External content fetched from GitHub is formatted into a local file (
digest-comments.md) without explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore any embedded directives within the comments. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, manage git branches and worktrees, use the
ghtool for repository interaction, and run local Python scripts viauvthat can interact with external APIs. - Sanitization: While the instructions explicitly warn against including credentials in output, there is no mechanism to sanitize or validate the natural language content fetched from external sources to ensure it does not contain malicious instructions aimed at the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on executing shell commands to perform its maintenance and research tasks.
- Evidence: Extensive use of
git,gh,uv,jq, andpythonscripts is documented inSKILL.mdandRESEARCH_GUIDE.mdfor operations such as cloning repositories, viewing issues, and probing API endpoints. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to clone and update repositories.
- Evidence: The orchestrator runs
gh repo clone pipecat-ai/provider-watch-reports _reportsto manage local report files. - Context: These downloads target the official repository of the skill's authoring organization and are necessary for the skill's stated purpose of tracking provider updates.
Audit Metadata