mai-voice
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to fetch external markdown content from a vendor URL to define parameters and schemas at runtime, which introduces an ingestion surface for untrusted data.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(fetches model reference fromhttps://www.pixazo.ai/models/mai-voice.md). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are present for the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to perform network requests (
curl,requests,fetch) and write to the local filesystem (~/.pixazo/api-key). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the external markdown content is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to automate filesystem operations for secret management.
- Evidence: The instructions guide the agent to save the user's API key to
~/.pixazo/api-keyand executechmod 600to set file permissions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources and installation commands from the vendor's infrastructure.
- Evidence: Fetches configuration from
https://www.pixazo.ai/models/mai-voice.mdand references an installation command for additional skills vianpx skills add Pixazo-AI/skills.
Audit Metadata