pixelforge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to store the user's API key in
~/.pixazo/api-key. While the instructions include setting restricted permissions (chmod 600), storing sensitive credentials in a predictable local file creates a target for local data exposure. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is instructed to fetch a remote markdown file from
https://www.pixazo.ai/models/pixelforge.mdto determine exact parameter names and accepted values during execution. This represents a dependency on external content to define the agent's logic. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The documentation mentions the use of
npx skills add Pixazo-AI/skills --skill '*', which involves the installation and potential execution of remote packages from a third-party repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data and user prompts.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via user-supplied prompts, reference image data, and the remote content fetched from
https://www.pixazo.ai/models/pixelforge.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses network operations (
curl,requests,fetch) and file system operations (writing to~/.pixazo/api-key). - Sanitization: There is no mention of escaping, validation, or filtering of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata