video-trim-api
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input including video URLs and text prompts, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points:
video_urland user instructions processed at runtime inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions that might be contained within the remote data.
- Capability inventory: Includes file system write access (
~/.pixazo/api-key) and network communication viacurl, Pythonrequests, and Node.jsfetchtogateway.pixazo.ai. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization for external content before it is processed or passed to API endpoints.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands for credential management and API interaction.
- Evidence: Includes shell commands for modifying file permissions (
chmod 600) on sensitive files and performing network requests usingcurl. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill handles a Pixazo API key by reading it from environment variables, files, or user input.
- Evidence: The skill instructs the agent to read and store the
PIXAZO_API_KEYin~/.pixazo/api-key. While this follows standard secret management practices for CLI tools (including restricting permissions withchmod 600), the agent is instructed to request and persist these credentials locally.
Audit Metadata