guided-review
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions contain a command to install the plannotator CLI by piping a remote script directly to the shell:
curl -fsSL https://plannotator.ai/install.sh | bash. This represents a high-privilege execution pattern, although it originates from the vendor's primary domain. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
plannotator guide sharecommand transmits the changeset diff and the generated guide to an external hosting service (guides.show). While the documentation notes that this is end-to-end encrypted, it involves moving local repository data to a third-party server. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires several local shell operations to function, including generating patches via
git diff, interacting with GitHub viagh pr view, and invoking theplannotatorCLI for export and sharing tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates network requests to
plannotator.aito retrieve the installation script and toguides.showwhen utilizing the sharing functionality. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository's diff (
guide.patch) and uses it to generate descriptive chapters. - Ingestion points: Reads local diff files and PR descriptions.
- Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the prompt instructions to separate untrusted diff content from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution for git, gh, and the vendor CLI, as well as network access for installation and sharing.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping of the diff content is described before the agent processes it to write the guide.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://plannotator.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata