gather
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
collect.mjsscript contains alocalizefunction that resolves and copies files from arbitrary paths on the host system. It explicitly supports resolving the home directory (~) and absolute paths. If a candidate JSON file (which can be populated by data from external sources) contains a sensitive file path in themediafield, the script will copy that file into the public-facing board directory and serve it via the local web server. - Evidence:
collect.mjslines 122-132. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Node.js script (
collect.mjs) shipped with the skill. This script is granted significant capabilities, including reading/writing arbitrary files, performing network requests, and hosting a local HTTP server, which significantly expands the attack surface if the script's logic is subverted. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdshell block in section 5. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from various external inspiration sources (Pond, marked.dev, Are.na, Mobbin, etc.). This creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in the titles, notes, or metadata of these external references could influence the agent's behavior during the gathering and labeling process.
- Ingestion points:
collect.mjsprocesses JSON files in thecandidates/directory, which are generated from external web content and APIs. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or safety instructions are used when the agent processes the external references.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read/write files and perform network operations via the
collect.mjsscript. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from external sources is performed before the agent processes it.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata