The Agent Skills Directory

[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions directly interpolate the $ARGUMENTS variable into shell command strings (node ... <file>). This creates a risk of command injection if the input provided to the skill contains shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &, |).
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple Node.js scripts (taste_audit.mjs, slop_tells.mjs, verify_overflow.mjs, verify_responsive.mjs) are executed with high-level access to the local file system using the node runtime.
[DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill includes an instruction to check for the existence of a tokens directory located outside the skill's root folder (ls ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/../../../tokens). While used as a configuration check, probing for directories with sensitive names is a suspicious pattern.
[INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to process untrusted data (UI renders, screenshots, and script output) through an 'adversarial' subagent. This provides an attack surface where instructions embedded in the UI being audited could potentially influence the agent's reasoning or output.
Ingestion points: Target files/directories, screenshots of UI components, and the output of taste/slop audit scripts.
Boundary markers: The skill uses a specific delegation header (KIT=...) but does not implement explicit sanitization or instructions to ignore embedded prompts in the audit targets.
Capability inventory: File system access via ls and node script execution.
Sanitization: No sanitization of the target files or script outputs is evident before they are passed to the design-critic subagent.

critique