prompt-engineering

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The PromptEvaluator and PromptOptimizer classes in scripts/prompt_optimizer.py exhibit an indirect prompt injection attack surface where untrusted data is processed.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the test_case.input variable and the output received from the LLM, which are both used in scripts/prompt_optimizer.py.
  • Boundary markers: The script lacks clear boundary markers or delimiters when interpolating external content into its evaluation meta-prompts (e.g., in _score_relevance and _score_clarity).
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to perform iterative LLM generations (llm.generate) and modify prompt templates dynamically based on these results.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or instruction-filtering for the content being interpolated into the scoring prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 12, 2026, 01:22 AM