pw-aippt-old
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external URLs or text blocks to generate slide content and image prompts.
- Ingestion points: The
/pw-aipptcommand described inSKILL.mdaccepts external URLs or text as input. - Boundary markers: The prompt generation process uses section markers such as
【风格约束】,【不可改区域】, and【可改区域】to guide the model, but these do not prevent adversarial instructions embedded in the source content. - Capability inventory: The skill uses subprocess calls to
pdftoppminscripts/pdf-to-images.jsand performs file system operations to manage project directories, prompt files, and images. - Sanitization: There is no documented sanitization or filtering of the input content before it is interpolated into instructions for the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/pdf-to-images.jsexecutes system commands usingchild_process.execSync. Specifically, it invokespdftoppmto convert PDF files into PNG images. While the file paths are quoted, this pattern allows for local system interaction based on project file names. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdandreferences/01_导出方法.mdguides users to install thepopplerlibrary via system package managers like Homebrew or APT. This is an expected dependency for the stated purpose of PDF processing and is documented clearly.
Audit Metadata