skills/pluviobyte/rnskill/dbs-save/Gen Agent Trust Hub

dbs-save

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to determine environment parameters and format metadata.
  • Evidence: Uses basename $(pwd) to automatically derive project identifiers ('slugs') from the current working directory.
  • Evidence: Executes python3 -c "from datetime import datetime; print(datetime.now().astimezone().isoformat(timespec='seconds'))" to generate formatted timestamps for file metadata.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill persists potentially sensitive information to the local file system in an insecure manner.
  • Evidence: Automatically extracts and writes "key conclusions," "rejected directions," and "user complaints" to plaintext files under the ~/.dbs/sessions/ directory.
  • Risk: The skill instructions explicitly acknowledge that the storage is unencrypted, creating a data exposure risk for commercial secrets or personal information handled during the diagnosis.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a persistence mechanism for untrusted user input that could influence the agent in future sessions.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation history, specifically raw user grievances and diagnostic dialogue.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses Markdown headers (e.g., ## 用户主诉) and YAML frontmatter as structure, but lacks instructions for future agents to ignore or escape embedded instructions within those fields.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file system writes (mkdir -p, file creation) and shell execution.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the user's original words is performed before persisting the content to disk.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 27, 2026, 08:46 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — dbs-save