dbs-save
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to determine environment parameters and format metadata.
- Evidence: Uses
basename $(pwd)to automatically derive project identifiers ('slugs') from the current working directory. - Evidence: Executes
python3 -c "from datetime import datetime; print(datetime.now().astimezone().isoformat(timespec='seconds'))"to generate formatted timestamps for file metadata. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill persists potentially sensitive information to the local file system in an insecure manner.
- Evidence: Automatically extracts and writes "key conclusions," "rejected directions," and "user complaints" to plaintext files under the
~/.dbs/sessions/directory. - Risk: The skill instructions explicitly acknowledge that the storage is unencrypted, creating a data exposure risk for commercial secrets or personal information handled during the diagnosis.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a persistence mechanism for untrusted user input that could influence the agent in future sessions.
- Ingestion points: Conversation history, specifically raw user grievances and diagnostic dialogue.
- Boundary markers: The skill uses Markdown headers (e.g.,
## 用户主诉) and YAML frontmatter as structure, but lacks instructions for future agents to ignore or escape embedded instructions within those fields. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file system writes (
mkdir -p, file creation) and shell execution. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the user's original words is performed before persisting the content to disk.
Audit Metadata