migrate-to-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
deletetool to remove original configuration files after migration is complete. While this is the intended functionality, it constitutes a destructive filesystem operation.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes strong instructional language ('CRITICAL', 'IMPORTANT') to define strict processing rules, which is standard for formatting tasks but involves override-style markers.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from local rule and command files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: The agent reads content from
.mdcand.mdfiles located in{workspaceFolder}and~/.cursor/directories. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the files being migrated.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
read,edit, anddeletetools, which could be misused if instructions within the migrated files influence agent behavior. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input file content is performed; the skill mandates character-for-character verbatim copying.
Audit Metadata