claude2figma
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates the download and installation of a package from 'github.com/senlindesign/claude2figma', which is not a recognized trusted vendor or well-known service organization.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: It instructs the user to run 'npx skills add senlindesign/claude2figma', a command that downloads and executes external code from the internet to modify the agent's environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides shell commands to check for existing installations in the home directory ('~/.design-agent-skills/skills/') and suggests using the shell escape character ('!') in Claude Code to execute these commands.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from Figma canvas operations to verify compliance, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Figma design data, including component instances, color tokens, typography, and spacing values.
- Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content are provided for the ingested design data.
- Capability inventory: Access to shell command execution (via npx), file system access in the home directory, and Figma canvas write capabilities.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external design data is mentioned.
Audit Metadata