claudedesignskills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates the download and installation of 22 separate creative coding libraries (e.g., Three.js, GSAP, Babylon.js) from the GitHub repository
freshtechbro/claudedesignskills. These are third-party resources not maintained by a recognized trusted organization.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to usenpx skills add freshtechbro/claudedesignskillsto fetch and execute external skill packages. This facilitates the execution of remote code from a non-trusted repository during the installation process.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include shell scripts to check for the presence of specific files and markers (e.g.,grep -q "^das:") in the local file system (~/.agents/skills/) to determine installation state before proceeding.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: By installing a high volume of external instructions (22 skills), the package significantly expands the agent's context and capabilities with unverified third-party content.\n - Ingestion points: The skill metadata and installation logic within
SKILL.mdandstub.yaml.\n - Boundary markers: None provided to isolate or sanitize the many external skills being installed.\n
- Capability inventory: File system status checks (
[ -f ]), text processing (grep), and package management commands (npx,/plugin).\n - Sanitization: No validation of the remote skill content is performed prior to integration into the agent's environment.
Audit Metadata