design-for-ai
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates downloading code and design system configuration from an external, non-trusted source.
- Evidence: Points to
https://github.com/ryanthedev/design-for-aifor the full package and usesryanthedev/rtd-claude-innfor as the plugin marketplace source. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Provides instructions to fetch and install third-party plugins and scripts which are executed within the agent's environment.
- Evidence: Specifically instructs the use of
npx skills addto install theprototype,clarify,usability, anddata-vizskills from theryanthedevrepository. - Evidence: Recommends installing plugins via
/plugin install design-for-ai@rtdfrom a third-party marketplace. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Contains shell scripts to perform environment checks and conditionally execute installation commands.
- Evidence: Bash snippets used to detect existing installations utilize
grepand file existence checks ([ -f ... ]) within the~/.agents/skills/directory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to process user-provided design briefs to generate executable artifacts, creating a surface for injection.
- Evidence (Ingestion points): Untrusted data enters via the
clarifyandresearchphases where user-provided design ideas are processed. - Evidence (Boundary markers): No explicit delimiters or safety instructions are present to prevent the agent from obeying malicious instructions embedded in user-supplied design requests.
- Evidence (Capability inventory): Includes rendering HTML mocks (
prototype), executing plan phases (build), and executing Node.js logic (scripts/*.mjs). - Evidence (Sanitization): There is no sign of sanitization or validation logic for external content before it is interpolated into prompts or used to generate build steps.
Audit Metadata