polar-sky-install
Audited by Socket on Nov 13, 2026
3 alerts found:
Anomalyx3This fragment documents an Okta integration setup: it creates a private-key-authenticated API Services app, grants `okta.groups.manage` and `okta.users.read`, assigns `ORG_ADMIN`, and uses the app to manage groups. The clearest security concern is the broad administrator role, which should not be assumed to be restricted by the stated OAuth grants; verify the effective permissions and prefer a narrower supported role. The process also handles a super-admin API token locally and gives explicit instructions to revoke it and remove its file. No direct malware behavior, unrelated network destination, or obfuscation is visible; severity is elevated due to the privileged configuration steps.
This fragment documents provisioning Google service-account credentials and configuring Google Workspace domain-wide delegation; it does not show credential theft, exfiltration, destructive actions, or other malware behavior. The key file path is `~/polar-sky-install/on-prem-key.json`, and the authorization links use `admin.google[.]com`; the specified access includes Drive content/sharing operations, group administration, and a Reports privilege, with exact scope values dependent on variables defined elsewhere. Treat this as a high-impact administrative setup requiring careful scope and client-ID verification, not as evidence of malware in this fragment.
This operational guide intentionally sends the Google Workspace service-account key file to Polar Sky at mcp[.]polarsky[.]ai and describes granting Workspace scopes that can include Drive content access. The transfer is disclosed as part of the setup and protected by HTTPS and a one-time token, but it remains a high-sensitivity credential handoff whose safety depends on trusting Polar Sky and its key handling. No covert malware behavior or obfuscation is evident in this documentation; the primary concern is the risk of granting and transferring powerful credentials.