rag-architect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill and its reference guides utilize a wide range of official libraries for building AI pipelines, including
langchain,openai,qdrant-client,rank_bm25,cohere,ragas,datasets,tiktoken,nltk,sentence-transformers,scikit-learn,numpy,transformers,torch,FlagEmbedding,weaviate-client,pinecone-client,pinecone-text,chromadb,psycopg2,trulens-eval, andtqdm. These are well-known packages from established organizations used for their primary intended purpose. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The RAG architecture described processes external data from untrusted sources, which presents an inherent indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests raw documents (e.g.,
raw_docs,document_text,long_document) to create chunks and embeddings, and handles user queries at runtime for retrieval. - Boundary markers: The provided code snippets do not implement explicit security boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within retrieved context.
- Capability inventory: The system is designed to perform network operations to AI service providers (OpenAI, Cohere) and vector databases (Qdrant, Pinecone, Weaviate).
- Sanitization: While the code provides text cleaning for processing quality (e.g., regex-based whitespace removal), it does not include security-focused sanitization to prevent the injection of instructions into the final prompt.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
LateChunkerimplementation inreferences/chunking-strategies.mduses thetrust_remote_code=Trueflag when loading models from Hugging Face (jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-base-en). This flag enables the execution of code defined in the model's repository. While the source is a recognized AI company, this pattern allows for remote code execution if the model repository were compromised or if the model name were user-controlled.
Audit Metadata