gplay-metadata-sync
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to use the
gplayCLI tool, involving several shell commands for pulling, validating, and applying metadata changes to the Google Play Store. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables a workflow where external, untrusted content from the Play Store is ingested into the agent's working environment.
- Ingestion points: The
metadata pullandimages pullcommands (referenced in SKILL.md) fetch live listing text and image metadata directly from the Google Play Store. - Boundary markers: There are no specified boundary markers or isolation instructions to prevent the agent from processing or obeying instructions that might be embedded within the listing text.
- Capability inventory: The
gplayCLI tool used by the skill has capabilities for network communication with Google Play APIs and local file system access for reading and writing listing data. - Sanitization: While the skill includes a
validatestep, this is restricted to structural linting (e.g., character limits and image dimensions) and does not provide sanitization for malicious prompt instructions contained within the listing content.
Audit Metadata