skills/polya20/grill-me/handoff/Gen Agent Trust Hub

handoff

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to execute the mktemp shell command to generate file paths for storing conversation data.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Summaries of the conversation—which often contain sensitive data, credentials, or PII—are written to the local filesystem in temporary storage locations (e.g., /tmp). This constitutes a local data exposure risk as these files may be accessible to other users or processes on the system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is instructed to 'read the file before you write to it' using a path generated by a shell command. This pattern is unusual for temporary files and could be exploited to read sensitive files if the path generation is compromised.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted conversation history to create a handoff document. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions in the conversation could be 'carried over' to the next agent session.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation history and user arguments are ingested and summarized.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between data and instructions within the conversation history.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses shell execution (mktemp) and filesystem read/write capabilities.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, sanitization, or escaping applied to the conversation content before it is written to the handoff file.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 15, 2026, 03:36 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — handoff