pome
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to install a remote MCP server from
https://mcp.pome.sh/mcpusing theclaude mcp addcommand. This pattern involves executing code hosted on a remote server controlled by the vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands locally, specifically the
pomeCLI for agent registration (pome register agent). It also references a REST launcher mechanism used to spawn external processes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external resources hosted on the vendor's domains, including
mcp.pome.shfor the MCP control plane andapp.pome.shfor reporting dashboards. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data, specifically the user's agent prompts and source code, to suggest testing tasks.
- Ingestion points: Agent manifest files (
pome.json), project repository code, and agent system prompts (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not specify delimiters to separate user data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell command execution (
pomeCLI), process spawning (REST launcher), and network communication via the Pome MCP. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the ingested agent code or prompt content is described.
Audit Metadata