content-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external source material including notes, transcripts, and rough drafts. This represents a potential vector for indirect prompt injection if the source content contains malicious instructions intended to manipulate the agent's behavior during the drafting or critique stages.
- Ingestion points: File
references/stages/intake.mdspecifies that notes, transcripts, and conversations are valid sources for the content pipeline. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to isolate the source material or to instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages file-write capabilities in
references/stages/approve.mdandreferences/stages/transform.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping logic is applied to the input source material before it is used in the pipeline.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
references/stages/approve.mdandreferences/stages/transform.md, the instructions command the agent to automatically write files to the local file system at~/Desktopor a path defined by the$KERNEL_WRITE_OUTPUT_DIRenvironment variable. The skill explicitly directs the agent to perform these writes and overwrite existing files of the same version, even if the user has not specifically requested a file creation task.
Audit Metadata