studio-clips
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests master script JSON files that are interpolated directly into the user prompt, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. If an input script contains adversarial instructions (e.g., in a section body), the model might follow those instructions instead of the skill's defined rules.
- Ingestion points: In
scripts/lib/run.mjs, the tool reads external files via the--scriptand--brief(with@prefix) arguments. - Boundary markers: The
SOCIAL_CLIP_USER_PROMPTinscripts/lib/prompts.mjsdoes not use clear delimiters (such as XML tags, triple backticks, or specific separators) to isolate the untrusted script text from the system instructions. It also lacks a directive for the model to ignore any instructions found within the script content. - Capability inventory: The skill script
scripts/lib/run.mjshas the capability to write files to the local filesystem (writeFileSync) and perform network requests to the OpenRouter API. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the script text before it is joined and passed to the model in
scripts/lib/prompts.mjs.
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