studio-script

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The readArg function in scripts/lib/run.mjs interprets any argument starting with the '@' character as a file path and reads its full content using readFileSync. This provides a mechanism for the agent to access sensitive files (e.g., ~/.ssh/id_rsa, .env, or configuration files) and include their contents in the model request. The content is then transmitted to the OpenRouter API, posing a high risk of sensitive data exposure.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user input via the --brief parameter and interpolates it directly into the model prompt in scripts/lib/prompts.mjs.
  • Ingestion points: The input variable in scripts/lib/run.mjs (derived from the --brief argument or a file) is the primary entry point for untrusted data.
  • Boundary markers: The SCRIPT_USER_PROMPT in scripts/lib/prompts.mjs lacks any delimiters (like XML tags or triple quotes) or system instructions to ignore embedded commands within the provided brief.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-reading (readFileSync), file-writing (writeFileSync), and network communication capabilities (via the studio-core dependency).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering for the data provided in the brief.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a shell wrapper script (scripts/run.sh) that executes a Node.js process (scripts/lib/run.mjs). While this is standard for the skill's operation, it establishes a local execution path that handles file system operations and environment variables.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 26, 2026, 06:33 PM