studio-script
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
readArgfunction inscripts/lib/run.mjsinterprets any argument starting with the '@' character as a file path and reads its full content usingreadFileSync. This provides a mechanism for the agent to access sensitive files (e.g.,~/.ssh/id_rsa,.env, or configuration files) and include their contents in the model request. The content is then transmitted to the OpenRouter API, posing a high risk of sensitive data exposure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user input via the
--briefparameter and interpolates it directly into the model prompt inscripts/lib/prompts.mjs. - Ingestion points: The
inputvariable inscripts/lib/run.mjs(derived from the--briefargument or a file) is the primary entry point for untrusted data. - Boundary markers: The
SCRIPT_USER_PROMPTinscripts/lib/prompts.mjslacks any delimiters (like XML tags or triple quotes) or system instructions to ignore embedded commands within the provided brief. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-reading (
readFileSync), file-writing (writeFileSync), and network communication capabilities (via thestudio-coredependency). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering for the data provided in the brief.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a shell wrapper script (
scripts/run.sh) that executes a Node.js process (scripts/lib/run.mjs). While this is standard for the skill's operation, it establishes a local execution path that handles file system operations and environment variables.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata