composio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables agents to read and act upon data from external SaaS applications, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in external content.\n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via trigger listeners such as
GITHUB_COMMIT_EVENTandGMAIL_NEW_EMAILdocumented inSKILL.mdandreferences/auth-and-triggers.md.\n - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content within ingested payloads are defined in the provided implementation patterns.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent capabilities to perform write actions, including
GITHUB_CREATE_ISSUEandGMAIL_SEND_EMAILas seen inreferences/sdk-reference.md.\n - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation logic for external payload data is demonstrated in the SDK references.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the Composio SDK and related agent integration packages.\n
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the user to installcomposio,composio-claude-agent-sdk,composio-core, andcomposio-claudevia standard package managers.
Audit Metadata