port-workflows

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents how to build automations that ingest untrusted data and process it via AI agents with access to powerful tools. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: SELF_SERVE_TRIGGER (user-provided form data) and EVENT_TRIGGER (external entity changes from the context lake) in references/node-types.md and example files like assets/event-driven-ai-incident-response.json.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation and examples (e.g., assets/event-driven-ai-incident-response.json) show direct interpolation of trigger data into AI prompts (e.g., {{ .outputs.trigger.diff.after.title }}) without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The workflow nodes include WEBHOOK (arbitrary HTTP requests), INTEGRATION_ACTION (GitHub/GitLab/Azure DevOps operations), CURSOR_AGENT (code modification), and UPSERT_ENTITY (modifying Port's internal data), as detailed in references/node-types.md.
  • Sanitization: No mention of input sanitization or JQ-based filtering for safety is provided in the references/data-flow.md or references/node-types.md instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 12, 2026, 07:42 AM