authoring-log-alerts

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests service names and log-derived metrics from the PostHog API, creating a vulnerability surface where untrusted data could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The agent calls posthog:logs-services and posthog:logs-count-ranges (in SKILL.md) to retrieve candidate services and their log distributions.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within service names or log metadata.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has write access to the project's alert configuration and can create notification destinations (Slack channels and Webhook URLs) via posthog:logs-alerts-create and posthog:logs-alerts-destinations-create.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization steps are defined for the ingested data before it is interpolated into alert names or configurations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the execution of local scripts to process data and generate threshold suggestions.
  • In SKILL.md, the agent is instructed to pipe JSON output from log tools into the included scripts/baseline_stats.py file using python3.
  • In references/volume-floor-alerts.md, a python3 -c one-liner is provided as a template for the agent to calculate specific volume-floor thresholds.
  • These executions are constrained to the skill's provided scripts and standard Python libraries, operating on locally retrieved JSON data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 06:41 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — authoring-log-alerts