authoring-log-alerts
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests service names and log-derived metrics from the PostHog API, creating a vulnerability surface where untrusted data could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent calls
posthog:logs-servicesandposthog:logs-count-ranges(inSKILL.md) to retrieve candidate services and their log distributions. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within service names or log metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill has write access to the project's alert configuration and can create notification destinations (Slack channels and Webhook URLs) via
posthog:logs-alerts-createandposthog:logs-alerts-destinations-create. - Sanitization: No sanitization steps are defined for the ingested data before it is interpolated into alert names or configurations.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the execution of local scripts to process data and generate threshold suggestions.
- In
SKILL.md, the agent is instructed to pipe JSON output from log tools into the includedscripts/baseline_stats.pyfile usingpython3. - In
references/volume-floor-alerts.md, apython3 -cone-liner is provided as a template for the agent to calculate specific volume-floor thresholds. - These executions are constrained to the skill's provided scripts and standard Python libraries, operating on locally retrieved JSON data.
Audit Metadata