creating-ai-subscription
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
promptfield in theposthog:subscriptions-createtool accepts free-text input from the user. This input is later processed by an LLM to generate HogQL queries and synthesize reports. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: The
promptargument inposthog:subscriptions-create(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The user-supplied prompt is processed without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands mentioned in the skill definition.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
posthog:subscriptions-createto schedule tasks where an LLM executes HogQL queries against project data and sends the results to external targets like email or Slack. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of sanitization or validation of the prompt content before it is stored and processed by the LLM.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the recurring delivery of project data to external sinks (email and Slack). Because the
target_value(email addresses or Slack channel IDs) is user-defined, it could be used to exfiltrate project data to unauthorized external accounts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The backend process triggered by this skill involves the dynamic generation and execution of HogQL queries based on the user-provided prompt. While this is the intended functionality for AI-generated reports, it represents a dynamic execution pattern where user input influences database queries.
Audit Metadata