diagnosing-missing-recordings
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.md(Step 2 and Step 4) provide SQL query templates that use direct string interpolation for the$session_idparameter (e.g.,WHERE $session_id = '<session_id>'). This pattern encourages the agent to build queries by concatenating user-provided input, which could allow a malicious user to perform SQL injection and execute unauthorized queries within the PostHog environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through manipulated diagnostic data.
- Ingestion points: The agent ingests data from the
eventstable via theposthog:execute-sqltool inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks instructions or markers to distinguish between authentic SDK-emitted properties and potentially spoofed properties injected by a malicious user into the events stream.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses database query tools (
posthog:execute-sql) and recording retrieval tools (posthog:session-recording-get). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the properties retrieved from the database before they are used to determine the diagnostic verdict.
- [SAFE]: The skill references troubleshooting documentation on
posthog.com. As PostHog is the official author of the skill, these references to their own domain are considered safe and routine.
Audit Metadata