exploring-mcp-sessions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from
$mcp_tool_callevents recorded in previous agent sessions. - Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via HogQL queries against the
eventstable, specifically pulling$mcp_intentand tool call properties in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define boundary markers or explicit instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded in the session data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
posthog:execute-sqlfor reading events andposthog:mcp-analytics-sessions-generate-intentfor LLM-based summarization. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the external session data before it is processed by the agent or the summarization tool.
Audit Metadata