instrument-product-analytics
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSOBFUSCATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes external codebase files at runtime to plan its operations (Step 1, 5, and 6 in SKILL.md).
- Ingestion points: The agent reads project dependency files (e.g.,
package.json,Gemfile,requirements.txt), lockfiles, and application source code to detect platforms and existing tracking logic. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructional guards to differentiate project code from its own operational instructions when reading files.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted extensive permissions, including writing files, executing shell commands for installation and linting (Step 3, 10), and accessing environment variables through the PostHog MCP server (Step 9).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering applied to the codebase data before it enters the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires shell access to manage dependencies and verify implementation quality.
- Development Tooling: It executes package managers (npm, pnpm, yarn, pip, composer, etc.) to install vendor SDKs and runs project-specific linter or Prettier scripts defined in
package.json(Step 10). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads official PostHog SDK packages and dependencies from established public repositories like NPM, PyPI, and Maven Central as part of the integration process.
- [OBFUSCATION]: The skill's reference documentation (e.g.,
references/astro.md,EXAMPLE-astro-view-transitions.md) includes minified JavaScript snippets for initializing the PostHog web client. These snippets are the standard, vendor-provided method for SDK initialization and do not represent malicious obfuscation.
Audit Metadata