querying-canvas-data
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents the
ph.agent.request(prompt)capability, which allows the canvas application to send natural language prompts back to the authoring agent. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if untrusted data retrieved from PostHog (such as task titles fromsystem.tasks, comment text, or user-definedph.stateentries) is interpolated into the prompt string without adequate sanitization or boundary markers. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
ph.query(PostHog insights, system tables) andph.state.get(persistent storage). - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly provide instructions for using delimiters or boundary markers when constructing strings for
ph.agent.request. - Capability inventory: The
phbridge supportsph.agent.request(agent interaction),ph.actions.invoke(data writes), andph.navigate(navigation). - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization or escaping requirements for data passed to the agent request API.
- Mitigation: The reference documentation notes that the platform host displays the exact prompt to the viewer and requires manual approval before dispatching the request to the agent.
Audit Metadata