querying-canvas-data

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents the ph.agent.request(prompt) capability, which allows the canvas application to send natural language prompts back to the authoring agent. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if untrusted data retrieved from PostHog (such as task titles from system.tasks, comment text, or user-defined ph.state entries) is interpolated into the prompt string without adequate sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context via ph.query (PostHog insights, system tables) and ph.state.get (persistent storage).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly provide instructions for using delimiters or boundary markers when constructing strings for ph.agent.request.
  • Capability inventory: The ph bridge supports ph.agent.request (agent interaction), ph.actions.invoke (data writes), and ph.navigate (navigation).
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization or escaping requirements for data passed to the agent request API.
  • Mitigation: The reference documentation notes that the platform host displays the exact prompt to the viewer and requires manual approval before dispatching the request to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 09:39 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — querying-canvas-data