working-with-autoresearch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from PostHog events and person properties through SQL queries. It also allows the agent to ingest free-text "suggestions" via the
posthog:autoresearch-suggestions-createtool, which are then passed to an autonomous training agent. - Ingestion points:
posthog:execute-sqlreads event and person data from the database;posthog:autoresearch-suggestions-createtakes user-provided prompts (suggestions) to steer the model. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions when processing event data or user suggestions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute SQL (
posthog:execute-sql), trigger model training runs (posthog:autoresearch-train-create), and modify person properties (posthog:autoresearch-partial-update). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the ingested event data or the text suggestions before they reach the LLM-driven training agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill describes a workflow where an "agent-driven predictive model" (a training agent) runs in a PostHog sandbox to write feature SQL and model code. This represents a dynamic execution attack surface where the generated code is derived from and operates on untrusted event data and schemas.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
posthog:execute-sqltool to perform operations such as querying theautoresearch_predictionevents and calculating score spreads. This tool allows for the execution of arbitrary SQL commands, which represents a significant capability for data access and manipulation within the PostHog environment.
Audit Metadata