run-posthog

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an installation script for the flox environment manager located at https://downloads.flox.dev/by-env/stable/install.sh.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Prerequisite environment configuration involves executing a remote script via curl | sudo bash to install the flox toolchain.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local CLI tools such as hogli, docker, and phrocs to manage application lifecycle, monitor database services (PostgreSQL, ClickHouse, Kafka, Redis), and inspect process logs.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Network operations are restricted to localhost:8010 for application health monitoring and automated test workspace configuration. No evidence of sensitive data transmission to external domains was found.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: No direct attempts to override safety filters or bypass constraints were identified. However, the following indirect prompt injection surface was detected:
  • Ingestion points: Browser-based MCP servers (Playwright or Chrome DevTools) read UI content and DOM structure from http://localhost:8010 during the verification phase.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from treating data retrieved from the web interface as authoritative instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to execute shell commands via hogli, manage system processes through phrocs, and interact with the local file system.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering applied to the UI data before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 24, 2026, 06:17 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — run-posthog