exploring-ai-failures
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data from production AI traces, which may contain adversarial content.
- Ingestion points: The
posthog:query-llm-tracetool reads raw content from$ai_inputand$ai_output_choices(as described in SKILL.md Step 3 and references/finding-traces.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when reading trace content, potentially allowing the agent to be influenced by instructions embedded in the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
posthog:execute-sqlfor data aggregation andposthog:query-llm-tracefor detailed record inspection. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the trace content is mentioned before it is presented to the agent for categorization.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
posthog:execute-sqltool to run structured queries against the PostHog database. While restricted to the database environment, this allows the agent to execute arbitrary data-plane logic as defined in the SQL templates within references/finding-traces.md.
Audit Metadata