exploring-apm-traces
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and displays external telemetry data (OpenTelemetry spans) retrieved from PostHog which could theoretically contain adversarial content.
- Ingestion points: The scripts
print_summary.py,print_timeline.py,extract_span.py, andsearch_spans.pyread JSON data files generated by PostHog tools. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to warn the agent to ignore embedded instructions within span names, attribute values, or error messages.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to reading, parsing, and printing the trace data; it does not perform network exfiltration or filesystem writes.
- Sanitization: Trace attributes and operation names are displayed directly as text, providing a potential surface for injection if the data contains malicious payloads.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves executing local Python scripts included in its package to analyze data.
- Evidence: The skill instructs the agent to run
python3commands on scripts such asscripts/print_summary.pyusing persisted JSON files as input. - Input parameters like
SPANandSEARCHare passed to these scripts via environment variables, which the agent sets based on user queries.
Audit Metadata