exploring-mcp-sessions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes session data, including tool calls and intents, which are ingested from external agent runs. This content represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the source data contains malicious instructions intended to manipulate the agent's behavior during analysis.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested in
SKILL.mdvia theposthog:mcp-analytics-sessions-listandposthog:mcp-analytics-sessions-tool-callstools. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or boundary markers when the agent processes the retrieved session history.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute arbitrary SQL via
posthog:execute-sqland access event properties across the PostHog environment. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for sanitizing or escaping the session content before it is presented to the agent for summarization or investigation.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The tool facilitates access to sensitive user metadata, specifically
person_emailanddistinct_id, as part of the session listing workflow. This behavior is consistent with the primary purpose of a PostHog analytics skill and is managed through official vendor tools.
Audit Metadata