inbox-exploration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a consumer for data from external integrations like GitHub, Zendesk, and error tracking systems, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via tools such as
inbox-reports-list,inbox-reports-retrieve, andposthog:execute-sql(in SKILL.md), which ingest summaries and signals generated by external sources. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or specific safety prompts to isolate untrusted external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including claiming reports, linking pull requests, modifying project source configurations, and initiating background agent tasks via
inbox-report-actions-run(in SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no defined procedures for sanitizing or validating the content of external signals before they are used to inform agent actions.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructional guidance on how to report system-held reports to the user, specifically advising against misattributing system judge decisions to the user. This is a benign directive aimed at ensuring technical accuracy in reporting and does not constitute a malicious concealment or jailbreak attempt.
Audit Metadata