installing-posthog-from-chat
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture allows for untrusted data from an external API to be injected into the agent's conversation flow.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the context via the
wizard-install-statustool, specifically through thenext_step,tasks, anderror_messageresponse fields as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to treat the external content as data rather than instructions. The instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly direct the agent to relay thenext_stepfield "as is." - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to list and retrieve GitHub repositories through integrations and initiate/monitor cloud-based installation runs (all defined in
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or schema validation is performed on the messages retrieved from the PostHog API before they are processed or displayed to the user.
Audit Metadata