instrument-product-analytics
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and analyze the user's codebase, including dependency files and multiple source files, to plan instrumentation (SKILL.md, Steps 1 and 5).
- Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use specific delimiters or to disregard instructions found within the code or comments of the analyzed files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write to local files (Steps 4, 6, 7, 8, 9) and execute shell commands for package installation and project verification (Steps 3, 10).
- Sanitization: Content from the analyzed codebase is not explicitly sanitized before being incorporated into the agent's workflow.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: A specific PostHog project token is hardcoded within the documentation reference files.
- Evidence: The string
phc_jE9kXU0depRekiuabVROlxxkIXn95NqsNO3qB4qNKtlis included inreferences/EXAMPLE-swift.mdas an environment variable. While this is a public-facing project key used for data ingestion, hardcoding specific tokens in reference implementations is a violation of security best practices. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs arbitrary command execution for dependency management and project verification.
- Evidence: The agent uses package managers to install the PostHog SDK (Step 3) and is instructed to run linter or build scripts found in the project's configuration (Step 10).
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs dependencies from a remote registry.
- Evidence: The agent installs official PostHog SDKs (e.g.,
posthog-js,posthog-node,posthog-python) using standard package managers (Step 3). These resources originate from a well-known service provider.
Audit Metadata