signals-scout-surveys
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user feedback from survey responses, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in a survey could influence the agent's reporting.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches raw survey responses using the
execute-sqltool to query theeventstable for properties such as$survey_responseand$survey_response_<id>(referenced inSKILL.mdandreferences/response-querying.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or protective framing (such as XML tags or explicit "ignore instructions") when interpolating these responses into the agent's context for clustering and theme aggregation.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the authority to author and modify human-facing reports using the
scout-emit-reportandscout-edit-reporttools, as defined in theallowed_toolssection and the "Decide" section of the instructions. - Sanitization: While the skill includes instructions to filter out internal test data and avoid including PII in the final reports, it does not mention sanitizing or escaping the content to prevent instructions embedded within the user-provided survey text from being followed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata