triaging-visual-review-runs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data from GitHub pull requests, CI job logs, and external images, which constitutes a vulnerability surface for indirect instructions.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from
gh pr view,gh run view, and PNG images downloaded viacurlfrom URLs provided by theposthog:visual-review-runs-snapshots-listtool.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or include explicit "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the content found within visual screenshots or CI log text.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to perform network operations (via
posthogtools andcurl), write to the local filesystem (viacurlto/tmp), and modify repository state (viaposthog:visual-review-runs-finalize-create).\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering for the retrieved logs or images prior to analysis.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads images from external S3 buckets to perform visual comparisons between baseline and current renders.\n
- Evidence:
curl -s -o /tmp/vr-baseline.png \"<baseline_artifact.download_url>\"\n - Context: These downloads are a core component of the visual review process. The URLs are provided by the vendor's own API tools, and the data is stored in a temporary directory for inspection.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses standard developer command-line tools to inspect the state of the repository and its CI runs.\n
- Evidence: Usage of
gh pr view,gh run view,git diff, andcurl.\n - Context: These commands are used for their intended purpose within a developer-centric workflow and do not involve suspicious parameters or privilege escalation.
Audit Metadata