trigger-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill translates natural language instructions into Postman CLI flags (such as
-i,-q, and--headers) without explicit guidance on escaping shell metacharacters, which could lead to command injection if malicious input is provided.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted JSON response bodies and headers from Postman Flow executions and displays them in the agent's context, creating an indirect prompt injection surface. 1. Ingestion points:SKILL.md(Step 3: "Response body"). 2. Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not wrap processed data in protective delimiters. 3. Capability inventory:SKILL.md(Steps 3, 4, and 5: Shell execution ofpostman flows trigger,deploy, andupdatecommands). 4. Sanitization: Absent; no filtering of response content is performed before presentation to the agent.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill interacts with authentication credentials viapostman loginand thePOSTMAN_API_KEYenvironment variable, and it specifically mentions the--show-secretsflag to unmask tokens during dry runs.
Audit Metadata