channel-messaging

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the postplus CLI tool to perform all operations, including managing connections, listing tools, and executing messaging tasks.
  • Evidence: Multiple instances of postplus channels tools run, postplus media-file upload, and postplus channels connect commands are used throughout SKILL.md and the reference files to interact with external APIs and local files.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external messaging services that could be used to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Message history and content are retrieved via tools such as DISCORDBOT_GET_MESSAGE (references/discord.md), SLACK_FETCH_MESSAGE_THREAD_FROM_A_CONVERSATION (references/slack.md), and WHATSAPP_GET_MESSAGE_HISTORY (references/whatsapp-business.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions require the agent to "Resolve five facts before any send" and verify parent message context, serving as a procedural boundary, although no technical escaping is specified.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has extensive write permissions, including sending messages (SLACK_SEND_MESSAGE, DISCORDBOT_CREATE_MESSAGE, WHATSAPP_SEND_MESSAGE) and uploading local files to the platform (postplus media-file upload).
  • Sanitization: No explicit instructions for sanitizing or escaping the ingested content are provided before the agent uses it to draft or send messages.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 05:35 PM