channel-messaging
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
postplusCLI tool to perform all operations, including managing connections, listing tools, and executing messaging tasks. - Evidence: Multiple instances of
postplus channels tools run,postplus media-file upload, andpostplus channels connectcommands are used throughoutSKILL.mdand the reference files to interact with external APIs and local files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external messaging services that could be used to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Message history and content are retrieved via tools such as
DISCORDBOT_GET_MESSAGE(references/discord.md),SLACK_FETCH_MESSAGE_THREAD_FROM_A_CONVERSATION(references/slack.md), andWHATSAPP_GET_MESSAGE_HISTORY(references/whatsapp-business.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions require the agent to "Resolve five facts before any send" and verify parent message context, serving as a procedural boundary, although no technical escaping is specified.
- Capability inventory: The agent has extensive write permissions, including sending messages (
SLACK_SEND_MESSAGE,DISCORDBOT_CREATE_MESSAGE,WHATSAPP_SEND_MESSAGE) and uploading local files to the platform (postplus media-file upload). - Sanitization: No explicit instructions for sanitizing or escaping the ingested content are provided before the agent uses it to draft or send messages.
Audit Metadata