execute-phase

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill reads external project data, including task descriptions, notes, and various markdown plan files, and interpolates their contents directly into the prompts for sub-agents ('potenlab-small-coder' and 'potenlab-high-coder'). This design creates a surface where malicious instructions hidden in the project documentation could influence the sub-agents' behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads 'progress.json' (Step 2.1) and instructs sub-agents to read 'docs/dev-plan.md', 'docs/frontend-plan.md', 'docs/backend-plan.md', 'docs/ui-ux-plan.md', and 'docs/progress.json' (Step 4.1d).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. Information from variables like '{task.notes}', '{task.verify}', and the content of documentation files are placed directly into sub-agent prompts without delimiters, boundary markers, or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator writes to the local filesystem ('progress.json'). The sub-agents ('potenlab-small-coder' and 'potenlab-high-coder') are tasked with implementing code, which inherently requires file system writes and potential command execution capabilities.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of validation, escaping, or sanitization is present for the content extracted from the documentation files or JSON fields before they are used to construct prompts for other agents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 8, 2026, 02:57 AM