skills/poteto/brainmaxxing/ruminate/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ruminate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process historical conversation logs, which serve as an untrusted data source that could contain adversarial instructions.\n
  • Ingestion points: Reads conversation history from JSONL files located in ~/.claude/projects/ via extract-conversations.py.\n
  • Boundary markers: Messages are prefixed with [USER]: and [ASSISTANT]:, but the skill lacks robust delimiters or explicit instructions for the analysis agents to ignore embedded commands within the text.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write to the brain/ directory and possesses the ability to directly modify the SKILL.md instruction files of other skills based on its findings.\n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the content of the extracted messages beyond simple truncation.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive user data stored in the local file system.\n
  • Sensitive file paths: It reads the full archive of past Claude conversations from ~/.claude/projects/, which may contain private information, credentials, or proprietary code discussed in previous sessions.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local scripts and shell commands to manage its data processing pipeline.\n
  • It calls a snapshot script from another skill: sh .agents/skills/meditate/scripts/snapshot.sh.\n
  • It uses a custom Python script: python3 .agents/skills/ruminate/scripts/extract-conversations.py.\n
  • It performs file system cleanup using rm -rf on the output directory.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 01:59 PM