skills/poteto/noodle/codex/Gen Agent Trust Hub

codex

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the codex CLI to perform various tasks, including local edits and network operations. It instructs the agent to use profiles such as --profile edit (workspace-write) and --profile full (danger-full-access), which grants broad filesystem and network permissions to the sub-process. The skill consistently mandates the use of 2>/dev/null in all commands, which suppresses standard error output and may conceal operational warnings or security-related failures from the user.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to delegate complex reasoning and code generation to external models, then ingest the resulting output, creating a surface for indirect instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Results from the codex workers are written to a temporary file created via mktemp and subsequently read into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potential malicious prompts embedded in the external model's output.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to execute go test, go build, and perform workspace writes based on the task delegation, providing a path for instructions in the output to be executed.
  • Sanitization: While the skill provides a best practice of verifying output via git diff --stat to catch unexpected file modifications, it lacks explicit sanitization or filtering of the text content returned by the external model before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 04:58 PM