skills/poteto/plugins/orchestrate/Gen Agent Trust Hub

orchestrate

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The measurement system in scripts/measurements.ts executes arbitrary shell commands using bash -c. These commands are authored by the AI Planner agent and stored in plan.json. While the execution environment is partially restricted via an environment variable allowlist and a temporary home directory, the commands themselves are not validated and could be used for malicious purposes if the agent is compromised or via prompt injection.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION_INDIRECT]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: The script reads handoff files from workers (untrusted data) via scripts/core/agent-manager.ts and scripts/core/prompts.ts.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. Instructions in references/handoffs.md specifically state "Don't enrich or sanitize; the planner needs the worker's words unfiltered."
  • Capability inventory: The system has significant capabilities including spawning new cloud agents, executing shell commands (via git and measurements), and posting to Slack.
  • Sanitization: Handoff bodies are interpolated verbatim into downstream agent prompts, allowing a malicious worker to influence the Planner's logic or downstream tasks.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill manages sensitive credentials including CURSOR_API_KEY and SLACK_BOT_TOKEN. Although scripts/core/redact-body.ts implements redaction logic for Slack comments, these secrets are inherently present in the environment for the orchestration scripts to function.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 19, 2026, 03:44 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — orchestrate