orchestrate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The measurement system in
scripts/measurements.tsexecutes arbitrary shell commands usingbash -c. These commands are authored by the AI Planner agent and stored inplan.json. While the execution environment is partially restricted via an environment variable allowlist and a temporary home directory, the commands themselves are not validated and could be used for malicious purposes if the agent is compromised or via prompt injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION_INDIRECT]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The script reads handoff files from workers (untrusted data) via
scripts/core/agent-manager.tsandscripts/core/prompts.ts. - Boundary markers: Absent. Instructions in
references/handoffs.mdspecifically state "Don't enrich or sanitize; the planner needs the worker's words unfiltered." - Capability inventory: The system has significant capabilities including spawning new cloud agents, executing shell commands (via git and measurements), and posting to Slack.
- Sanitization: Handoff bodies are interpolated verbatim into downstream agent prompts, allowing a malicious worker to influence the Planner's logic or downstream tasks.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill manages sensitive credentials including
CURSOR_API_KEYandSLACK_BOT_TOKEN. Althoughscripts/core/redact-body.tsimplements redaction logic for Slack comments, these secrets are inherently present in the environment for the orchestration scripts to function.
Audit Metadata