Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a monkeypatching technique to dynamically override theget_inheritedmethod of thepypdf.generic.DictionaryObjectclass at runtime. While the skill indicates this is a fix for a specific library bug, runtime modification of loaded code represents a form of self-modifying code behavior. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from PDF documents via methods like text extraction, OCR, and image analysis, which creates a surface for malicious content to influence agent instructions.
- Ingestion points: Text extraction in
SKILL.mdusingpypdfandpdfplumber, form metadata extraction inscripts/extract_form_field_info.py, and OCR inSKILL.mdusingpytesseract. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or specify that the agent should ignore instructions embedded within the processed document text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file-writing (
pypdf,reportlab) and command execution (qpdf,pdftotext). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from external PDFs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation (
SKILL.mdandreference.md) encourages the execution of various command-line utilities such asqpdf,pdftotext,pdftk, andpdftoppmfor rendering and manipulating documents.
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