canvas-export
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell scripts to perform its tasks, including
scripts/tqandscripts/new-canvas. - Evidence: These scripts invoke
curlfor API communication,python3 -cfor parsing JSON configuration from the local filesystem, andopen -a(on macOS) to launch the tldraw application. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads a local configuration file to obtain authentication credentials for the tldraw offline app.
- Evidence:
scripts/tqreadsserver.jsonfrom standard application support directories to retrieve a per-sessiontokenandport. This information is used exclusively for authorized communication with the local application vialocalhost. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a potential vulnerability surface because it processes external canvas data during the export process.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved via
editor.toImageDataUrland other Editor API calls. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions specify clear workflows but do not explicitly define delimiters for canvas content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local filesystem and execute shell commands via scripts.
- Sanitization: The skill treats the canvas export as raw image/vector data to be written to disk, which limits the potential for instruction injection to affect the agent's logic.
Audit Metadata